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and Carbon Taxation 
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how fossil fuel-producing countries can counteract climate policy. We 
analyze the exhaustion of oil resources and the subsequent transition to a backstop technology as a 
strategic game between the consumers and producers of oil, which we refer to simply as ―OECD‖ and 
―OPEC,‖ respectively. The consumers, OECD, derive benefits from oil, but worry about climate effects 
from carbon dioxide emissions. OECD has two instruments to manage this: it can tax fuel consumption 
and decide when to switch to a carbon-neutral backstop technology. The tax reduces climate damage and 
also appropriates some of the resource rent. OPEC retaliates by choosing a strategy of price 
discrimination, subsidizing oil in its domestic markets. The results show that price discrimination enables 
OPEC to avoid some of the adverse consequences of OECD’s fuel tax and its switch to the backstop 
technology by consuming a larger share of the oil in its own domestic markets. Our results suggest that 
persuading fossil exporters to stop subsidizing domestic consumption will be difficult. 
 
Key Words:  dynamic games, stock externalities, carbon tax, non-renewable resources, energy 
subsidies 
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The Fossil Endgame: Strategic Oil Price Discrimination  
and Carbon Taxation  
Jiegen Wie, Magnus Wennlock, Daniel J.A. Johansson, and Thomas Sterner 
Introduction 
The focus of recent international climate negotiations has been burden sharing by large or 
well-developed countries, such as the United States, China, European Union member countries, 
India, Japan, South Africa, and Brazil, whose positions on it are far apart. Despite big differences 
in ambition and who they believe should pay, ultimately, these countries are likely to accept the 
notion that policy instruments are needed and that emitting carbon dioxide must become more 
expensive to consumers. To date, they have had a hard time agreeing at U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties meetings, such as 
Copenhagen, and this has led many observers to look for emissions reduction policies that stop 
short of binding agreements. One of the policies promoted by the Group of 20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors (G20) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, is 
the abolition of fossil fuel subsidies, which appear all the more irrational because they raise 
emissions and are assumed to be bad for the global economy. According to IMF (Coady et al. 
2010) and the International Energy Agency (IEA 2010), considerable economic benefits can be 
reaped by removing subsidies.1 
The suppliers of fossil fuels tend to be strongly opposed to emissions taxes. They often 
argue that taxes do not reduce carbon emissions, but are merely a device by which importing 
governments steal the resource rent. We know that effective international agreement on climate 
policy is extremely tough to achieve. The fossil fuel-exporting countries are among those most 
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likely to obstruct climate negotiations. It is therefore crucial to understand their economic 
motives, which is the heart of this paper. 
The issue of the exporters’ loss has been touched on by international climate agreements. 
To gain acceptance and ratification from energy-exporting countries (primarily members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC) for the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, article 4.8 of the UNFCCC and articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol state that 
these countries should be compensated for lost export revenues. The issue of compensation has 
at times been driven intensively by some OPEC countries2 and is seen as a major obstacle in the 
climate negotiations (e.g., Barnett and Dessai 2002; Aarts and Janssen 2003).  
As might be expected, a range of modeling studies have found that OPEC would lose rent 
as a result of policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Berg et al. 1997; McKibbin et al. 
1999; Bernstein et al. 1999; Ghanem et al. 1999; Bartsch and Muller 2000; Radetzki 2002). 
Contrary to these findings, Persson et al. (2007) and Johansson et al. (2009) argue that carbon 
dioxide prices may increase the resource rent for conventional oil producers because alternative 
sources for scarce conventional oil, such as oil sands, oil shale, and coal-to-liquids, will be taxed 
at an even higher rate as a result of higher levels of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of useful 
energy from these alternatives. 
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategic motives of the oil-exporting 
countries that sell petroleum products cheaply in their domestic markets. This clearly risks 
encouraging domestic consumption, which undermines international efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions. Will this price differentiation reduce or eliminate the effects of carbon taxation? We 
need to understand this better before making any potential judgments about compensation.  
The possibility of price differentiation between markets is potentially important because 
of the issue of carbon leakage. (This aspect has not been addressed in the academic literature.) In 
this paper, we formally analyze the effect of price discrimination on domestic and international 
markets as a response to taxation by importing countries. We seek to understand the importance 
                                                 
2 Numerous examples provide evidence of this attitude in the OPEC Bulletin and elsewhere, such as the following 
quote from AFX News Limited (2005), which appeared on the Forbes.com website: ―Saudi King Abdullah, whose 
country holds the world’s largest oil reserves, vowed to continue to provide enough supplies, but called on leading 
consumer states to cut taxes on petroleum products.‖ In the 2007 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 13) 
meeting in Bali, the OPEC countries argued that they should be compensated for climate policies that might reduce 
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of these subsidy strategies to the efficiency of climate policy, and indirectly to its impact on 
international negotiations on climate change. 
For an exhaustible resource that generates profits, efficient resource managers would 
ensure that the resource rent is reflected in the market price. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
this resource rent should rise exponentially, at least in simplified economic models (Hotelling 
1931). However, a number of studies show that this pattern may change as a result of complex 
interactions between the taxation of externalities from fossil fuels and the scarcity rent (Sinn 
2007; Sinclair 1992, 1994; Ulph and Ulph 1994; Wirl 1994, 1995; Hoel and Kverndokk 1996; 
Tahvonen 1995, 1996; Hoel 1993). Results from these studies show that the tax may decrease 
eventually as oil approaches depletion. For example, Sinclair (1992) concludes that constant 
taxes merely squeeze rents and have no impact on the time profile of extraction; expectations of 
falling energy taxes serve as the stimulus to reduce extraction rates and postpone the adverse 
consequences that carbon emissions induce. Carbon taxes not only serve the purpose of 
correcting externalities but may also enable countries importing oil to appropriate at least part of 
the resource rent (Santiago and Escriche 2001; Liski and Tahvonen 2004). Unfortunately, this 
fits very well with beliefs put forward by politicians in the oil-exporting countries: they are 
skeptical of the environmental zeal in the West and see the taxes as a means of snatching their 
rent. 
This paper studies a non-cooperative open-loop Nash equilibrium carbon tax in a model 
with a strategic importer and a strategic exporter. We focus particularly on the dual pricing 
decisions by the strategic exporter for its domestic and international markets. Empirical data 
show that many oil-producing countries discriminate in different markets, selling oil products 
more cheaply in the home market.3 We believe that this may be an important extension of the 
debate because earlier studies on emissions taxes have focused on international markets, ignoring 
the domestic markets of the exporters. A few studies have analyzed the importance of dual 
pricing for an oil-producing cartel, but not in relation to emissions taxation (Kalymon 1975; 
Brander and Djajic 1983; Wirl 1983); these papers show that a cartel has an incentive to 
discriminate in pricing.  
                                                 
3 In December 2007, when international bulk prices for gasoline in Rotterdam were US 105¢/gallon, the retail 
consumer prices in some oil-producing countries were as follows: Iran, 18.4¢/gallon; Libya, 19.8¢/gallon; Kuwait, 
41.9¢/gallon; Qatar, 32.8¢/gallon; and Saudi Arabia, 22.2¢/gallon. Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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OPEC’s domestic market is important, consuming almost 20 percent of its annual 
primary oil extraction, and this share is expected to grow (Gately 2007). In Indonesia, the 
domestic market is close to one-half of its total annual oil output, and the net exports of some oil 
producers, such as Mexico, have fallen drastically because their domestic markets have grown so 
fast—which is partly a result of the low domestic price.  
Our analysis uses a strategic game between the consumers and producers of oil. There are 
two agents: an energy resource-exporting cartel (hereafter OPEC, although it includes all oil 
exporters), which is assumed to be the only seller of fuel to importing countries, and a group of 
resource-importing countries (hereafter OECD, after the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development). For the purposes of our game, we assume that both OPEC and 
OECD consume fuels produced from oil, and we assume that the oil is homogeneous and has 
only one possible substitute, referred to as the ―backstop.‖ Clearly this is a vast simplification, 
removing gas, coal, and many other sources of energy from the picture, but it allows us to focus 
attention on important dynamics of the game without losing anything substantial.  
An alternative interpretation of our model is that ―oil‖ stands for all fossil fuels. We 
assume that OPEC is the sole producer and source of oil. OPEC thus faces the traditional 
dilemma of economizing with an exhaustible resource. OECD, on the other hand, is concerned 
about maximizing welfare, achieved (among other strategies) through the mitigation of 
environmental damages from the elevated atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide. We assume that 
this elevated stock causes damages that are a concern only to OECD. Naturally, this is again a 
simplification, but OPEC has, at least historically, been strongly against any regulation of 
emissions from oil. At its disposal, OECD has a simple tax on oil.  
If OECD taxes oil, OPEC might react strategically by increasing the producer price in 
order to receive a larger part of the tax revenues that would otherwise remain in the oil-importing 
countries. This would, however, lower demand and (beyond some point) revenues, and put the 
oil price beyond the full control of the fuel-exporting countries because the path of rent will also 
be affected by taxes levied by OECD. Our objective is to consider the optimal design of the 
carbon tax in the presence of a two-sided strategic interaction: the buyer can set and coordinate 
taxation, and understands the effect of taxes on fuel prices; and the seller can coordinate sales 
and understands the effect of sale prices on taxation.  
We also analyze the optimal time path for OPEC’s oil extraction. We assume that OECD 
will switch to a carbon-neutral technology (the backstop), once the consumer price reaches the 
opportunity cost of the backstop. Therefore, the optimal time path implies overall depletion at a Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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date we call T, and at a time t
*, when OECD stops importing and switches to the backstop 
technology. We particularly study the role of choke prices4 and the development of the backstop 
technology for the timing of resource depletion. The basic implications of backstop technologies 
for non-renewable resource markets have been analyzed in a range of papers (e.g., Nordhaus 
1973; Heal 1976; Gallini et al. 1983; Dasgupta et al. 1983). In relation to climate change issues, 
the implications of backstops have been central to the discussion of the ―green paradox‖ in which 
policies such as a rising fuel tax may have the opposite effect to that intended (leading to an 
escalation of current exploitation, see Sinn 2007; Gerlagh 2011).  
By way of comparison, our paper also considers a case without price discrimination, 
using just a uniform oil price that would be maintained in the absence of domestic subsidies in 
OPEC.5 This implies that domestic consumers have to pay a higher price for oil and, as a result, 
would consume less; thus, more oil can be exported and the oil lasts longer. This brings revenue 
to the exporters, but in the strategic game situation we model here, it also implies that OPEC has 
less ability to counteract the tax imposed by OECD and thus it also lowers OPEC’s net social 
payoff. This case also has direct policy relevance, in light of the G20’s call to reduce fossil fuel 
subsidies (IEA 2010). 
In section 2, we describe the game model. The third section analyzes optimal taxation and 
the timing of depletion. The case without price discrimination and with a uniform world oil price 
is presented in section 4. These results allow us to see more clearly the effect of strategic 
gaming. The majority of the results are possible to derive analytically, but we also follow up with 
a simulation in section 5. The final section concludes, and the appendices contain the formal 
solutions to the game.  
1. The Model  
 To make the model as simple as possible, we assume that the world consists of two 
agents: one is resource rich, and the other is resource poor. For convenience, we refer to the 
resource-rich exporter as OPEC and the resource-poor importer as OECD—note that they do not 
correspond exactly to the actual organizations. We assume that no oil is extracted within OECD. 
In reality, oil is extracted not only in the OPEC cartel countries, whose coalition sometimes 
                                                 
4 The choke price is the minimum price that brings down the demand in an area to zero. 
5 Some oil exporters, such as Norway, do not engage in price discrimination. Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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suffers from stability problems, but also in a range of fringe countries, such as Russia, the United 
States, and Norway. However, for the purposes of our analysis, two agents will suffice. 
The model includes two stocks—OPEC’s oil deposit stock S in the ground and the carbon 
stock E accumulating in the global atmosphere. Because carbon is directly moved from OPEC’s 
oil deposit to the global atmosphere as a result of consumption in OECD and OPEC, we can 
express the change in stocks as a function of oil consumption in OPEC and OECD, hereafter 
indexed 1 and 2, respectively:  
 ̇                 (1) 
 ̇                      (2) 
where  1 x  and  2 x  are functions of time and, for simplicity, stand for  1() xt and  2() xt. Together 
they correspond to withdrawals from OPEC’s oil deposit stock S in equation (1) and add carbon 
to the atmospheric stock E at the transfer rate 0    in equation (2). ʴ is the decay rate of carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere, crudely representing the net uptake of carbon dioxide by the 
biosphere and the oceans. 
The annual oil consumption levels  1 x  and  2 x are determined by OPEC, acting as a 
monopolist in the OECD market and as a social planner in the OPEC market, subject to the oil 
demand functions (3) and (4) in OPEC and OECD, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that the 
demand functions remain constant over time. The linear demand function on the OPEC market is 
given by:  
1 1 1 1 xp       (3) 
OECD is assumed to be interested in limiting carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel 
use and in developing a backstop technology, resulting in a kinked linear demand function: 
2 2 2 2
2
2
( )   if  




   

     
        (4) 
The backstop is a carbon-free source of energy that could be supplied at a cost equal to 
p . This technology could be a simplified representation of options, such as carbon-neutral fuels 
or electricity generated from solar, wind, nuclear, or coal with carbon capture and storage. Here, 
we assume that 22  / p   ; in other words, the backstop price is lower than the choke price 
when OECD demand falls to zero. 
 Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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The policy instrument that OECD uses is a tax on oil consumption,  () t  . The use of this 
tax will influence the time (t
*) at which a region stops using oil. There are three possible cases: 
1) OECD stops using oil first and switches to the backstop, 2) OPEC stops first, and 3) OECD 
and OPEC stop simultaneously. We assume 11 / p   ; in other words, the maximum 
willingness to pay in OPEC is higher than p .6 Note that consumers in OPEC will continue 
consuming oil even after OECD switches to the backstop. We focus our analysis on the first 
case.  
2. Taxation and Pricing with Price Discrimination 
Given the dynamics of oil and carbon stocks in equations (1) and (2), and in the demand 
functions in equations (3) and (4), we solve for the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Here, OPEC can 
set different prices in the OPEC and OECD markets, and OECD can tax oil consumption of its 
consumers. In the next subsection, we derive and discuss OECD’s open-loop Nash taxation 
strategy, followed by OPEC’s open-loop Nash pricing strategy in subsection 3.2.  
2.1 Taxation Strategy in OECD
 
The OECD social planner cares about OECD social welfare, covering its consumer 
surplus, its tax revenues, and the damage caused by carbon dioxide. The policy instrument that 
OECD can use to maximize social welfare is a tax,  () t  , on OECD oil consumption. Omitting 
the time index for simplicity, the OECD value function can be written as:  
 
*






t t t T T
t
E CS
CS x E e dt e Ee dt e
    
  
  
         
    (5) 
where  2 CS  is the OECD consumer surplus from consuming oil;  2 x   is the tax revenue;  E    is 
the instantaneous damage from the stock of carbon; 
*
2 2 2 /
t CS e
 
  is the consumer surplus from 








Ee dt E T e
    
    is the damage caused by 
accumulated carbon emissions after time t
*, when OECD has switched to the backstop 
technology. (See appendix 1 for the list of variables for further clarification.)  
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technology.  Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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Using equations (3) and (4), and integrating the scrap value function by parts, the 




2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 [( ( )) /(2 ) ( ( )) ]
t tt p p E e dt Ve
         
              (6) 
subject to the dynamics in equations (1) and (2), and the demand functions (3) and (4), and 




( ( ) ) 2*
2 2 2 2 2 ( ) /(2 ) [ ( ) ]/( )
T S t s t
S V p E t e ds
         
         . Note 
also that after time t
*,  0 2  x . 
 Solving the problem for OECD in appendix 2, the tax is found to contain two terms, the 
Pigovian shadow cost of carbon from oil consumption  2 .   , and the value of resource stock  2   
from OECD’s perspective:  
22             (7) 
The evolution of the shadow cost of carbon is:  
*
*
22 ( ) ( ) *
22 ()
t t t t
t t e e d
      
          (8) 
which is equal to the present value of its marginal accumulated damage. Furthermore, the 
shadow value of the resource stock: 
*
2() *
22 ( ) ( )
tt t t e
 
    (9) 
is equal to the present value of resource rent at time t
* when OPEC stops exporting to OECD.  
Rearranging the first order conditions in equation (A.2) in appendix 2 and substituting the 
shadow values  ) (
*
2 t   and 
*
2() t  , evaluated at the end of the game—given by transversality 








   
 
   
  (10) 
The two terms on the right-hand side of equation (10) represent the shadow cost of 
consuming each unit of oil ( 2 .   ) and the shadow value of the oil stock for OECD. The Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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shadow value part is equal to the marginal damage of the emitted carbon, which is independent 
of the stock and time as a result of the linearity of the damage function.  
With a higher pure rate of time preference, the shadow cost of carbon will decrease 
because the future damage becomes smaller. The shadow value of the resource stock is negative 
for OECD because the remaining stock of oil in OECD when it switches to the backstop will be 
consumed by OPEC. For OECD, it implies only climate damages and no benefits. Hence, there 
is a cost to leaving oil in the ground when switching to the backstop. Because the shadow value 
of remaining oil underground is exactly equal to the damage caused by carbon emitted at the 
time when OECD gets close to the transition to backstop technology, the tax becomes zero. The 
sum of these shadow values gives the socially efficient tax levied on oil consumption in OECD. 
Hence, the optimal tax falls over time. 
The optimal decreasing tax reflects the leakage effect from the existence of several 
separate markets for oil. The OECD tax has two effects: it discourages local oil consumption and 
thereby encourages oil consumption in OPEC. A higher tax in the beginning implies an earlier 
transition to the backstop technology in OECD (hence, lower carbon emissions today by OECD), 
and more oil for OPEC to consume (hence, higher carbon emissions in the future by OPEC). 
This, however, has some environmental advantage for OECD because the earlier emissions to 
the atmosphere would have created a larger loss.  
2.2  Pricing Strategies in OPEC with Price Discrimination 
OPEC acts as a monopolist vis-à-vis OECD and as a social welfare maximizer in the 
OPEC market. Consequently, OPEC’s objective function adds up to an OPEC consumer surplus 
and an OPEC producer surplus of extracting oil for both OPEC and OECD markets. Facing the 
two demand functions (3) and (4), OPEC can discriminate in its pricing. Besides welfare 
maximization, one reason for pricing differently—which we do not take into account in our 
modeling—is that OPEC governments may want to buy political support. They may expect that 
cheap oil will lead to industrialization or they may feel pressured by local opinion (suspicion by 
the public of its own leaders) to share the rent with the common man (or motorist).  
OPEC chooses the domestic price of oil  1 p  and the international price of oil  2 p , both of 
which affect the optimal timing T for the depletion of resources, given the taxation imposed by 




1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 [ ( )/(2 ) ( ) ( , )]
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This is subject to the dynamics in equations (1) and (2), given the demand functions (3) and (4), 
and the non-negativity constraints of  1 x and  2 x , where 
1
2
11 ( )/(2 ) xp   is the OPEC consumer 
surplus and  1 1 1 () p x p  and  2 2 2 ( , ) p x p   are producer surpluses from the OPEC and OECD 
markets, respectively.  
Because the choke price in OPEC is higher than the opportunity cost of the backstop 
technology available in OECD, OPEC will exit from the OECD market before stopping sales in 
the domestic market, which thereafter continues until the oil stock is depleted. Hence, at some 
point in time         before total depletion at T, OPEC stops exporting to OECD and OECD 
switches to backstop technology.  
As the sole supplier to OECD’s market, OPEC will balance the benefits of additional 
sales with costs, in terms of a lower price on oil and the forgone availability of the resource in 
the future. From equations (A.15), (A.16), (A.19), and (A.20) in appendix 3, the producer price 
in OECD can be described by: 








                    
 ̅                                          
       (12) 
The optimal price is influenced by two terms: the first is the OPEC shadow value of the 
resource that drives the price to increase over time; and second is the tax levied by OECD. 
Substituting the price in equation (12) into demand function (4), the equilibrium supply in the 
OECD market becomes: 
1() * 12
22
1 2 2 2 2
*
1
( )  t [0, ]
2 ()






   
          
  
    (13) 
From the condition that
**
2( ) ( ) p t t p   , we can derive the difference in the timing of 
exit from the two markets T – 
* t :  
* 12
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2
11
ln( / /(2 / )) ln( /(2 )) T t p p

    
   
        (14) 
where the right-hand side uses the conclusion from equation (10); in other words, at t
*  when 
OECD stops importing, the endogenously chosen optimal tax 
*   is equal to 0.  Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
11 
The difference T – 
* t  in the timing of exit from the two markets is determined by the 
choke prices in OPEC and OECD, and the backstop technology in OECD. The larger the choke 
price in OPEC or the lower the cost of the backstop technology in OECD, the larger the 
difference in exit timing between the two markets.  
OPEC’s goal in extracting and selling oil in the domestic market is to balance the 
marginal benefits and user cost of extraction. This can also be viewed as selecting the optimal 
price path supported by the respective sales in each moment. The optimal oil price charged by 
OPEC in its own market  1 p  equals the shadow value of oil  1   from OPEC’s perspective, which 









  (15) 
and the corresponding equilibrium sales can be expressed as: 
1()
1 1 1 1 1(1 )
Tt x p e
    
      (16) 
which declines over time as the price rises. 
The optimal time for OPEC to deplete the resource can then be obtained by solving the 
identity equation for the exhaustible resource: 
*
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
T T t
S x p x p dt x p dt x p dt          (17) 
The exhaustible resource equation reflects the important fact that the limited resource can 
be consumed at different times and in different markets, and OPEC has the ability to allocate its 
resource across time and markets.  
Summarizing, we find that the tax determined by OECD is set to balance the loss of 
consumer surplus from consuming fuel, the tax income, and the benefits of reducing carbon 
emissions. The optimal fuel tax includes both a Pigovian tax7 and a strategic trade policy 
component. Given that OPEC and OECD have the same time preferences, the tax declines over 
time.  
                                                 
7 A tax levied on agents or market activites that pollute (adversely affect) the environment or that generate negative 
externalities. Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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We find that the larger the choke price in OPEC or the cheaper the backstop technology 
in OECD, the larger the difference in timing between t
* and T. Also, when the backstop 
technology is improved, it will induce the consumers in OECD to substitute it for fossil fuel 
earlier, but it will have the opposite effect on the timing of resource depletion in OPEC. This 
implies a paradoxical situation similar to the falling tax discussed by Sinn (2007). The producer 
understands that a cheaper backstop decreases the future value of oil and hence lowers the price 
of oil today, thus increasing current exports; this leads, in turn, to increased early carbon 
emissions and greater present value damage in OECD.  
3. Pricing Strategies without Price Discrimination 
In this section, we analyze what happens if OPEC abolishes subsidies and does not 
discriminate on prices for between its domestic market and the OECD markets, implying that the 
producer price for the single international market is uniform. However, we assume that OECD 
can still the tax oil consumption of OECD consumers; therefore, OECD may face a different 
price path as a result of OPEC’s uniform pricing strategy, compared to the dual pricing case. The 
problem set up for OECD in equations (5)–(10) remains the same, with the exception of a change 
in notation from  2 p  to  p , denoting the common international price of oil for OPEC and OECD. 
The problem for OPEC now is to choose the same price p of oil for both domestic and 
international markets. The objective function, in which social welfare is maximized and where 




1 1 2 0 [ ( )/(2 ) ( ) ( , )]
T t x p px p px p e dt
 
     (18)
 
subject to the dynamics of the oil stock (equation [1]) and the carbon stock (equation [2]), the 
non-negative constraints of  1 x  and  2 x , and the constraint that the consumer price in OECD is not 
larger than the opportunity cost of the backstop technology—that is, pp  . 
Because we have assumed that the choke price in OPEC  11 /   is larger than the 
opportunity cost of the backstop technology  p , consumers in OPEC will continue consuming oil 
after OECD switches to the backstop until the resource is depleted. Let 
* t  denote the time at 
which OPEC stops exporting. After 
* t , OPEC supplies only its own market and the problem for 




11 [ ( )/(2 ) ( )]
T t
t x p px p e dt
 
     (19) Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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subject to:  
1 1 1 () S x p 

     
 
and  1 1 1 0 xp        (20)
 
In this optimization problem, the price charged to domestic consumers equals the shadow 
value of the resource to OPEC’s social planner, which grows exponentially at the rate  1  . The 
price grows until it reaches the choke price and all consumers stop consuming oil; therefore, the 









  (21) 
and the respective domestic sales are: 
1()
1 1 1 1 1(1 )
Tt x p e
    
       (22) 
To fully solve the problem in equation (17), we need to describe the pricing, extraction, 
and taxation path when OPEC supplies both its domestic and the international markets. From 
appendix 4, we find the uniform price: 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 ( )/( 2 ) p               (23) 
At t
*, OECD will stop consuming oil and switch to the backstop and OPEC, as a social 
welfare maximizer, will start to supply only its domestic market at price
* p . In addition, we 
assume that arbitrage between the T – t
* and t
* – t periods—that is, before and after the switch to 
the backstop technology in OECD—is not possible, and hence there cannot be a discontinuous 
jump in the international oil price at t
*. This implies that the optimal oil price follows the path: 
1( *)
* * * 1
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
1




        


         (24) 
and the resource rent during 
* [0, ] t  is:  
**
11 ( ) ( ) * 1 2 2
11
12
( 2 ) t t t t p
ee
   


    

   
  (25) 
The difference in timing T – t
* can be solved from equation (24): Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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    
  
  
  (26) 
The difference in exit timing from the two markets is now determined by the choke price 
in OPEC and the backstop technology in OECD. The higher the choke price or the cheaper the 
backstop, the larger the difference between the two markets for the duration of oil use. In 
summary, the prices charged to domestic consumers in OPEC and OECD are given, respectively, 
by equations (27) and (28):  
                {
             ̅                                               
                                                                                                
     (27)
  The respective demand quantities are given by the demand functions and we can solve 
the optimal time for OPEC to deplete the resource from the exhaustible condition, that is: 
     ∫            
 
    ∫     
 
     ∫            
  
                                                       (28) 
On the right-hand side, the equation is implied from the result that the resource will be 
consumed in both markets before 
* t and will serve only the domestic market from 
* t until 
depletion. 
4. Simulation Analysis 
In both the discriminatory and uniform pricing cases, the resource rent and the timing of 
depletion and exit from the markets are jointly determined. This makes analytical results difficult 
to obtain in explicit formulae that can be compared. We therefore proceed by carrying out 
simulations of pricing and taxing strategies under different cases and test for the sensitivity of the 
result to changes in essential parameters.  
4.1 Oil and Carbon Data 
Table 1 presents the base parameters in our simulation analysis. OPEC’s proven 
conventional oil reserves were estimated to be about 935 billion barrels in 2005 (BP.com 2006). 
This constitutes about 75 percent of the total proven conventional oil reserves. These data 
concern only proven reserves—not the ultimately recoverable reserves that include reserve 
growth due to technological progress and new reserve findings, which would increase the 
extractable resource base. For simplicity, we stick to the proven reserves. In addition, this study Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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neglects large amounts of unconventional oil reserves (plus coal and other fossil energy 
resources, etc.).  
The current atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide is about 215 billion metric tons of 
carbon above the pre-industrial level (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). 
Roughly, each barrel of oil contains 6.1 gigajoules (10
9 joules) of carbon, which implies that 
OPEC’s reserves are about 5,500 exajoules (10
18 joules). The carbon content of oil is about 0.02 
kilograms per millijoule (10
-3 joule), thus the total carbon stock in the oil reserves is roughly 110 
gigatons of carbon. 
The marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions is subject to enormous 
uncertainties in the climate system itself and additional uncertainties regarding how ecosystems 
and social systems will be affected by changes in climate. In addition, the effectiveness of 
adapting to climate changes is most uncertain. Economic estimates of the social cost of carbon 
dioxide are usually in the range of US $0–$500 per ton of carbon (Tol 2005; Fischer and 
Morgenstern 2003; Pearce 2003). We assume that the damage cost of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere is $5 per ton of carbon per year. Given a discount rate of 4 percent and an annual 
decay rate of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere of 1 percent, we get a total discounted social cost 
of an additional ton of carbon dioxide of $100 per ton of carbon.  
Table 1. Base Parameters for Simulation 
Parameter  Value 
Total OPEC reserve (billion barrels)  S0 = 935 
Atmospheric carbon above the preindustrial level 
(gigatons)  E0 = 215 
Carbon transfer coefficient (ton/barrel)  Γ = 0.122 
Marginal yearly damage of carbon ($/ton carbon)  Θ = 5 
OPEC demand coefficient   α1 = 3.00 
- (billion barrel)  β1 = 0.015 
OECD demand coefficient  α2 = 23.00 
-(billion barrel)  β2 = 0.115 
Cost of backstop($/per barrel equivalent)  p  = 150 
Decay rate of carbon dioxide  σ = 0.01 
Discount rate in OPEC  1 0.04    
Discount rate in OECD  2 0.04    Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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Several potential alternatives to conventional oil are currently being discussed—ethanol, 
hydrogen, synthetic diesel from coal, and so on—and it is still not clear which alternatives will 
be prominent sources or carriers in the future. We assume carbon-neutral hydrogen produced 
from a carbon-neutral source (e.g., renewables, nuclear, or coal with carbon capture and storage) 
as a backstop. The main reason for benchmarking the cost of the backstop for this technology is 
that the future cost of hydrogen has been extensively assessed. Current (optimistic) estimates of 
this technology when mature are about $100–$200 per barrel of oil equivalent (e.g., Johansson et 
al. 2009). We assume that the opportunity cost of the backstop technology is about $150 per 
barrel. 
We calibrate the demand functions in OECD and OPEC from various empirical studies 
and data. OECD’s demand elasticity varies across time, space, and specifications, and responds 
asymmetrically to price changes (Gately and Huntington 2002). We simply use the elasticity (–
0.5) from the preferred specification in Gately and Huntington’s work. We assume that the 
demand in OPEC is less price elastic at –0.2, according to the most recent estimate for oil 
demand in the Middle East (Narayan and Smyth 2007). The demand equations are estimated by 
linearization around average price and quantity values for the last five years for each region. This 
gives demand parameters for the linear demand function of β≈0.115 and ʱ≈23.0 for OECD, and 
β≈0.015 and ʱ≈3.0 for OPEC.  
We assume that the decay and discount rate are 1 percent and 4 percent, respectively. The 
former is a simple approximation of more complicated non-linear representations of global 
carbon cycles.8  
4.2  Simulating the Fossil Endgame  
The shadow value of oil in the ground for OPEC starts low and grows exponentially at 
the pure rate of time preference until it reaches the choke price in the dual pricing case (price 
discrimination). It also increases exponentially in the uniform pricing case, with the exception of 
a jump in the shadow value when OECD leaves the market (see figure 1). 
                                                 
8 For more in-depth studies of the carbon cycle, a multitude of different time constants are needed to reflect the 
different time scales at which carbon dioxide equilibrates between atmosphere, oceans, biomass, soil, sediments, and 
rocks (Archer et al. 2009).    Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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Figure 1. Shadow Value of Oil for OPEC 
 
 
The comparison shows that the shadow value of oil is higher in the dual pricing case than 
in the uniform pricing case prior to the jump in the shadow value, when OECD leaves the market 
and where the shadow value of oil becomes higher in the uniform pricing case beyond the jump. 
Then the effect of the backstop technology and the tax to suppress the shadow value disappears. 
The value of oil jumps by around $40 per barrel and then resumes exponential growth until it 
reaches the choke price. This shows that the ability to discriminate is clearly a benefit to OPEC.  
If OPEC can discriminate in its prices, it will set a significantly lower domestic price, 
implicitly subsidizing domestic consumers. This price is equal to the shadow value of oil shown 
in figure 1. For the OECD market, OPEC would, however, set a higher price; figure 2 shows 
both producer and consumer prices. The latter are, in both cases, equal to the producer price plus 
tax. Note that the rise in OECD prices is smaller than the fall in the domestic price in OPEC in 
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Figure 2. Consumer and Producer Prices in OECD 
 
 
Comparing figures 1 and 2, we see that the gap between the prices charged to OPEC and 
OECD consumers diminishes as OECD approaches the switch to the backstop because the 
shadow value of oil for OPEC will increase faster than the tax imposed by OECD. Irrespective of 
whether OPEC discriminates in its price, the tax path imposed by OECD starts high and 
decreases over time, reaching zero when OECD stops importing oil. When OPEC discriminates 
in pricing, OECD responds by imposing a smaller tax as a result of the higher producer price 
charged by OPEC. Note that, in this sense, OPEC is very successful! Far from being able to 
retaliate by raising the tax that OPEC dislikes so much, OECD actually lowers it. Price 
discrimination is doubly attractive to oil producers: not only does it (maybe) serve some 
domestic goals but it is also an effective way of persuading OECD to lower its taxes! 
Figure 3 shows the corresponding paths for the sale of oil. The simulations show that the 
percentage of domestic consumption in OPEC is much higher with price discrimination than 
without it. And the market share of OPEC is about twice as high with the price discrimination 
strategy. The elimination of price discrimination by OPEC would smooth the path of total 
extraction, lowering it today and leaving more for the future—which, of course, has an 
environmental benefit. The switch to the backstop by OECD would be delayed as a result of the 
decrease in the price charged to OECD when the price discrimination strategy is replaced by 
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Figure 3. Consumption and Extraction Path 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper analyzes oil taxation (by oil importers, played by OECD) as an instrument of 
climate policy in the context of a game, in which oil exporters (played by OPEC) subsidize local 
demand strategically to counteract taxation. The analytical model contributes to a better 
understanding of the strategic incentives among oil-producing and oil-consuming countries. The 
tax imposed by OECD contains both Pigovian and strategic elements. The first element equals 
the shadow cost of carbon emissions from each unit of oil consumption, and hence the 
accumulated damage. The strategic element starts high and falls monotonically, leading to a net 
zero tax when OECD leaves the market. By this tax profile, OECD can counteract the rising 
resource rent and postpone the consumption of oil to slow down emissions, and thus reduce 
(discounted) climate damage.  
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce the possibility of price discrimination 
by oil producers. When possible, OPEC will sell oil more cheaply to its domestic market than to 
export markets. This is important because such discrimination is widely observed among oil-
producing countries and already has led to substantial increases in domestic petroleum 
consumption by these countries. The discriminatory pricing strategy by OPEC has important 
consequences. It enables OPEC to reduce the ―adverse‖ consequence it perceives from the tax 
imposed by OECD, allowing it to recapture some of the rents it would lose through such taxation 
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taxation—and, in the real world, maybe even attract OECD industries—thereby reclaiming rents 
and undoing the climate policy of OECD. 
Significantly lowering the domestic price of oil products may not be a good overall 
industrialization strategy, but it could be effective in attracting some of the petrochemical, 
plastics, fertilizer, and other industries that use oil or fossil fuel energy intensively. It makes the 
domestic market increasingly important as the resource stock is extracted toward depletion.  
The climate effect of OECD taxation is also weakened because price discrimination 
increases the share of domestic (OPEC) consumption—a form of carbon leakage. This is hugely 
relevant for political discussions, which are typically framed in terms of compensation of lost 
export revenues for oil-exporting countries as a result of climate policies. Reducing domestic 
petroleum product prices is also a popular way to distribute rents in many countries that lack 
other more sophisticated distribution mechanisms. What is central from a climate change 
perspective is the fact that price discrimination actually leads the importing countries to lower 
their taxes below the Pigovian level!  
Our results show that the efficacy of OECD carbon taxation is strongly limited by the 
power of OPEC countries to discriminate in their prices. Sometimes subsidy reduction is 
portrayed as an easy ―win–win‖ strategy. This is a potentially dangerous underestimation of the 
forces at play. Price discrimination and local subsidies are definitely in the material interests of 
exporters and is also easy to defend ideologically because exporters argue that the main motive 
for taxation by importing countries is really to steal their rents. 
The non-cooperative outcome of OPEC’s discriminatory pricing behavior will increase 
current carbon emissions and lead to faster depletion of resources and larger climate damages. 
The central option open to environmentally concerned policymakers in OECD is to negotiate 
with OPEC. They need to persuade the leaders of fossil fuel-exporting countries that climate 
change is a real concern. They also perhaps need to find ways to ensure that the producers do not 
stand to lose substantial oil rents from universal climate policies. OECD should want OPEC not 
to discriminate in its pricing but, ideally, to participate in taxing oil products. From a strategic 
game viewpoint, it seems that there may indeed be a case for finding some way to compensate 
the producers—for instance by sharing access to a backstop technology.  
   Resources for the Future  Wie et al. 
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Appendix 1. List of Symbols, Parameters, and Variables 
Symbol  Definition 
i = 1,2 
Index for areas, i = 1 is OPEC and 2 is OECD
 
Parameter  Definition 
i    Discount rate in OPEC (i = 1) or OECD (2) 
   Marginal damage of carbon 
   Parameter transferring fossil fuel into carbon dioxide 
αi, βi 
Parameters of the petroleum demand equation for 
region i 
p   Opportunity cost of the backstop technology in OECD 
Variable  Definition 
CSi
  Consumer surplus in OPEC (1) or OECD (2)
 
i x   Resource use in OPEC (1) or OECD (2) 
i p   Producer price of oil in OPEC (1) or OECD (2) 
i    Lagrangian multiplier for  i x  
   Tax of oil in OECD 
S  Stock of oil in OPEC 
S0  Initial stock of oil in OPEC 
ST  Stock of oil in OPEC at the end of the game 
E  Stock of carbon 
i    Cost of carbon in region i 
i    Value of oil stock in region i 
* t   Time at which OPEC stops supplying the first market 
T   Time at which OPEC depletes its resource stock 
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Appendix 2. 
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Using Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the necessary conditions are: 
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Solving differential equations (8) and (9) yields the shadow cost of carbon:  
*
*
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Transversality conditions are: 
*
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* * *
2 2 2 2 ( ) /( ), with  ( ) /( ) if  ( ) 0 t V S t S t                 , and   (A.8) 
**
* * *
2 2 2 sup ( , ) ( )
t t t t H H x x V V t E t


         .  (A.9) 
Appendix 3. 
The current-value Hamiltonian of the free endpoint problem (10) can be written as: 
.  (A.10) 
Using Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the necessary conditions are: 
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1 1 1    

 ;  (A.13) 
with the Lagrangian constraints: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 ( 0,when  0; 0 when  0) x x x          ,  (A.14) 
2 2 1 2 1 2 0 ( 0,when  0; 0 when  0), x x x           and   (A.15) 
2 2 2 ( ) 0 ( 0,when  0; 0 when  0) p p p p p p                   ;  (A.16) 
and the transversality conditions are:  
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 .  (A.18) 
The optimal prices set by OPEC in domestic and OECD markets are given by the first-
order conditions (A.11) and (A.12). Rearranging yields gives: 
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The Lagrangian constraints (A.14), (A.15), and (A.16) are conditions of complementary 
slackness. As the OECD consumer price    2 p  reaches the backstop level  p , OECD switches 
to the backstop technology and OECD demand for oil falls to zero by equation (4) and constraint 
(A.15) binds. Simultaneously, constraint (A.16) then also binds. One conclusion implied by 
transversality condition (A.18) is that the OPEC supply to the domestic market  ) ( 1 T x  at the 
terminal time T  goes to 0.  
Using (A.18), we can get 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) 0 x T T       , which implies that  1 1 1 () T     . 
Hence: 
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Appendix 4. 
For the time 
* t ( , ] tT  , the current-value free time Hamiltonian function is:  
1
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( )/(2 ) ( ) H x p px p x x         .  (A.23) 
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are:  
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and from (A.24), we get:  
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1 1 1 1()
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   
   .  (A.30) 
From (A.28), we can conclude that (A.25) is binding. Hence  
1 1 1 ( ) / T      .  (A.31) 
Appendix 5. 
For 
* t [0, ] t  , the current value Hamiltonian function is: 
1
2
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The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are:  
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( ) 0 ( 0,when  0; 0 when  0) p p p p p p                  .   (A.37) 
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Considering the interior solution from (A.33), we obtain: 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 ( )/( 2 ) p             .   (A.39) 
The demand for OPEC and OECD are:  
*
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and the equilibrium demand in OECD’s market is: 
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